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Abstract 
This study examines the role of corporate philanthropy in the management of reputation risk 
and shareholder value of the top 100 ASX listed Australian firms for the three years 2011-
2013.  The results of this study demonstrate the business case for corporate philanthropy and 
hence encourage corporate philanthropy by showing increasing firms’ investment in 
corporate giving as a percentage of profit before tax, increases the likelihood of an increase in 
shareholder value. However, the proviso is that firms must also manage their reputation risk 
at the same time. There is a negative association between corporate giving and shareholder 
value (Tobin’s Q) which is mitigated by firms’ management of reputation. The economic 
significance of this result is that for every cent in the dollar the firm spends on corporate 
giving, Tobin’s Q will decrease by 0.413%. In contrast, if the firm increase their reputation 
by 1 point then Tobin’s Q will increase by 0.267%.  Consequently, the interaction of 
corporate giving and reputation risk management is positively associated with shareholder 
value. These results are robust while controlling for potential endogeneity and reverse 
causality.  This paper assists both academics and practitioners by demonstrating that the 
benefits of corporate philanthropy extend beyond a gesture to improve reputation or an 
attempt to increase financial performance, to a direct collaboration between all the factors 
where the benefits far outweigh the costs.  
 
 
Key Words: Corporate philanthropy, reputation risk; shareholder value 
 
Acknowledgements: 
We would like to thank the London Benchmarking Group in Australia for their 
encouragement and assistance in this project.   We thank the participants at the 2015 
European Accounting Association conference Glasgow and Janet Mack for their insightful 
comments. We would also like to thank QUT for financial assistance and research assistants 
Alexandra Williamson and Marie Crittall. 
3 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Why do corporations engage in corporate philanthropy when corporate philanthropy has little 
direct impact on corporate financial performance? According to Friedman (1970) there are 
few economic benefits to be gained from corporate philanthropy, but numerous costs 
associated with it. However, firms may engage in corporate philanthropy for other reasons 
including: benefits to managers by enhancing their reputation within social circles (Friedman, 
1970; Werbel and Carter, 2002); furthering their political and career agendas (Galaskiewicz, 
1997); or as part of building the competitive advantage of the firm (Porter and Kramer, 2002; 
Wang and Qian, 2011). As corporate philanthropy is a product that can be marketed to the 
public (Collins, 1994; Lowengard, 1989; Simon, 1995), it is an investment of resources that 
has a longer term benefit to the firm (Bennett 1998) through enhanced reputation. Bruch and 
Walter (2005:50) suggest ‘only philanthropic activities that create true value for the 
beneficiaries as well as enhancing the company’s business performance are sustainable in the 
long run’. It is essential for corporation long term success to gain competitive advantage and 
engaging in corporate philanthropy is one way to achieve this (Porter and Kramer, 2002; 
Wang and Qian, 2011). 
Merging two streams of research; 1) the association between corporate philanthropy and 
reputational risk; and 2) the association between corporate philanthropy and shareholder 
value, we set out to determine whether corporate philanthropy enhances shareholder value by 
reducing reputational risk. To our knowledge, this notion has not been empirically tested 
before.  Research attempts to legitimize corporate philanthropy by establishing a business 
case for the relationship between corporate philanthropy and firm performance (e.g. Griffin 
and Mahon, 1997) with little success.  We suggest that this is because there is a negative 
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association between corporate philanthropy and firm performance, simply because it is a cost 
which reduces profit. Consequently, the contribution of this research is determining the role 
corporate philanthropy plays in the management of reputational risk and shareholder value. 
We demonstrate that the business case for corporate philanthropy must be made with the 
firm’s considerate management of its reputation. 
 
In a Utopian world, companies would donate money to the community and gain resounding 
social and financial return on this investment.  Non-profit organisations (NPOs) and their 
beneficiaries would be better off, and boards and CEOs could adopt corporate philanthropy 
(CP) without question, as a sustainable business practice because of its tangible benefits.   
However, in reality, as Liket and Simaens assert (2015, p. 287) CP has had ‘an ambivalent 
relationship to the bottom line’.  By exploring the interplay between corporate philanthropy 
and shareholder value our study aims to add more clarity to this imprecise relationship. In 
other words, it seeks empirically to boost the business case for corporate philanthropy.   
 
In reviewing 122 journal articles Liket and Simaens also conclude the practice is loaded with 
‘conceptual and practical challenges’ (p. 285).  Indeed, if CP were a magic bullet to 
shareholder wealth, past studies would be less ambivalent in their findings and CP investment 
would be more uniform and extensive.  Clearly other factors influence CP outcomes.  In an 
effort to bolster the academic and managerial CP base, this study investigates whether one 
such factor, a company’s management of its reputation, impacts the relationship between CP 
and shareholder value or is affected by CP.  A body of research (Bai and Chang 2015, 
Hansen et al 2011, McKinsey 2008, Luo and Bhattacharya, 2006) argues a company’s 
reputation can improve its results and distinguishes reputation management as a rich concept 
to explore in counterpoint to CP. The main contribution is therefore, to demonstrate that firms 
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that engage in CP (for whatever motivation) must also improve their reputation to increase 
their shareholder value.   
In summary, this research examines whether shareholder value increases when companies lift 
their giving, while taking into consideration their reputation management.  Three phases were 
undertaken.  First, giving levels in our sample of the top 100 listed firms across three years 
had to be determined. Next, we measured these companies’ corporate reputation through a 
comprehensive media analysis.  Finally, we calculated whether the interaction of corporate 
philanthropy and reputational risk is associated with increasing shareholder value.  
 
The results confirm that investing more in CP as a percentage of profit before tax makes an 
increase in shareholder value more likely. However, the proviso is that firms must also 
manage their reputation risk at the same time.  A negative association emerges between CP 
and shareholder value (Tobin’s Q), which is mitigated by firms’ management of reputation. 
 
This study is sited in Australian companies’ data.  Australia is an interesting context because 
of its intersections with many other business and social cultures.  As a Commonwealth nation 
its heritage and legal framework around philanthropy and commerce rest on a United 
Kingdom (UK) tradition.  Yet Australia is physically located in the Asia-Pacific space and its 
business and philanthropy research spheres have an increasing crossover with this region 
where CP is subject to different influences.  Australia is also aligned to the United States 
(US) economically and socially, and influenced too by US practice and research.  
Domestically, the 2015 establishment of a Prime Minister’s Community Business Partnership 
is spurring policy and practice interest in CP.  Many local companies are part of the London 
Benchmarking Group (Australia and New Zealand) activities and some also participate in the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), these groups promote methods for measuring and 
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reporting on CP activities.  According to Gautier and Pache (2015) Australia is one of the 
eight nations contributing in a measurable way to worldwide CP publications.  However, as 
one of several countries authoring only one percent of the total there is clear room for more 
Australian focus in this area. This focus will add to the local and wider bodies of knowledge 
and proffers perspectives beyond the more heavily studied US and UK landscapes (Gautier 
and Pache).  
Corporate philanthropy is a growing concern  for Australia given the recent Asian Tsunami 
and other natural disasters like the Brisbane floods and bushfires in Victoria and the need for 
corporate support for initiatives in these areas. These types of natural disasters are common 
among the UK and the US philanthropic activities. Why would we expect corporate 
philanthropic activities to differ in Australia and thus contribute to the literature? The legal 
position on corporate giving differs in Australia compared to the UK and the US. Australian 
donations are slightly lower in comparison to the UK and significantly less than the US 
(Philanthropy Australian, 2015; Chester and Lawrence, 2008). The disclosure is voluntary in 
Australian and in the US, while in 1985 the UK brought in the Companies Act where 
companies are obliged to disclose charitable donations that exceed200 pounds. Since about 
1960, corporate giving in Australia has grown to encompass a variety of initiatives including 
in-kind donations, staff giving as well as direct cash donations. Although companies are not 
required to disclose their direct donations, they are required to disclose the direct cash 
they donate through foundations for tax derived benefits through the foundations tax-free 
status (Carrol and Buchholtz, 2011: 489). Given the different legal and tax requirements of 
Australian corporate giving we expect to find differences based on altruistic and commercial 
incentives for corporate philanthropy (Chester and Lawrence, 2008).  
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This study will also add another critical element to the debate surrounding corporate 
philanthropy and shareholder value by including the interaction with corporate reputation.  
Australia is catching up with the US and the UK and bringing reputation to the forefront of 
management strategic considerations.  However this is only to extent that this focus on 
reputation will lead to the expectation of financial rewards in the form of shareholder returns. 
Therefore this study takes this consideration and explores how the interaction between 
corporate philanthropy and reputation lead to positive shareholder return.  The results of 
which will provide theoretical and practical guidance to support corporate philanthropy 
activities and management of reputation to increase shareholder returns.    
From this context, this article outlines the importance of building on the existing CP research 
platform before discussing the constructs and prior literature relevant to this study’s two main 
research questions around corporate reputation and shareholder value.  It then outlines the 
results and their implications. 
 
1.1 Importance of corporate philanthropy 
Current CP research takes place against the background of: an evolving and still contested 
business understanding of CP (Liket and Simaens); some years after a global financial crisis; 
at a time when NPOs are more actively seeking new forms of revenue and partnerships to 
meet needs (Chikoto and Neely 2014); and when ‘sheer scale indicates the necessity to 
further our understanding of CP’ (Liket and Simaens, p. 287).    
 
To consider the initial point, boards need reliable information on which to base CP policy and 
investment decisions.  They must be equipped to judge the benefits of corporate donations to 
the community as well as to the business.  Increasing research is focusing on how best to 
measure community impact of the corporate and other contributions, with an estimated 75 
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types of social measurement now in use (Epstein and Buhovac, 2014).  However, boards also 
need to judge the impact of CP on the company’s sustainability and on key stakeholders such 
as those who hold its shares.  Board members face the tension ‘between economics and 
ethics’ (Windsor 2006, p.94).  It is here that our study seeks to contribute.  Much has been 
trumpeted about the ‘business case’ for corporate philanthropy but the amount of conclusive 
empirical data is outstripped by rhetoric.  Existing studies on CP and shareholder value are 
summarised in the following section. 
 
The importance of this research is clear also in light of the impact that economic downturns 
such as the recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC) can have on corporate giving. In 
corporations and industries particularly affected by kneejerk budget constraints, cuts may 
occur to CP programs.  Some research suggests the community effect of less CP investment 
is prolonged because corporate giving is slower to recover than individual giving (for 
example, Sum and Jacob 2014). Even in Australia, which experienced a lesser flow-on from 
the GFC than many countries, research found many had unwillingness to engage in new 
corporate community activity at this critical time (Centre for Corporate Public Affairs, 2009).  
A study of twelve of Australia’s largest companies (Downes et al 2012) suggests that 
economic uncertainty and the tone at the top of corporations influences donations, which in 
turn are related to the certainty of future cash flows. Thus, corporate giving is often reduced 
in the times when it is particularly needed by NPOs (that is, when NPOs’ clients are also in 
strained economic times and needing more help and NPOs own investments and other 
donation sources are hit by downturns). 
This perennial need on the part of community organisations is the third factor that underlines 
the value of this research. As Madden and Scaife assert (2007, p. 151) ‘Giving may be 
increasing, but so too are non-profit numbers as well as the fact that traditional government 
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funding is waning’.  They also point out current corporate giving forms only a fraction of the 
funds needed. If more corporations can be encouraged to think strategically about such 
activities as something that also benefits the shareholder constituency this may provide the 
impetus for more businesses to make corporate donations and open the way for a wider and 
deeper engagement between business and community organisations for mutual benefit.  
Finally, CP has been established in the literature as a form of enlightened self-interest that 
can contribute to the firm’s competitive positioning in terms of attracting customers, 
employees, or strategic partners.  Early research positioned CP as a product that can be 
marketed to the public who increasingly want to know a company’s stance on its relationship 
with the community (Collins, 1994; Lowengard, 1989; Simon, 1995). It is an investment of 
resources that while helping the community can also benefit the firm (Bennett 1998) through 
enhanced reputation, which in turn may bring employee recruitment and retention benefits, 
create more customer interest and purchases and reduce public and regulatory scrutiny. Bruch 
and Walter (2005, p. 50) reinforce the importance of both the corporate and community 
stakeholders benefitting and the principle of mutual benefit.  They suggest that ‘only 
philanthropic activities that both create true value for the beneficiaries and enhance the 
company’s business performance are sustainable in the long run’.    
This logic seems to be in play in various markets that are seeing continued CP activity and 
varying rates of growth and sophistication in practice, especially in terms of greater 
disclosure and reporting (Committee Encouraging Corporate Philanthropy 2015).  The 
Chronicle of Philanthropy (2012) reports on surveys conducted by various professional 
organisations in both the United States and Europe that showed a post-GFC increase in the 
total amount of gifts made by corporations. This increase has been attributed to two factors: 
corporations requiring ways of gaining competitive advantage as well as an increased 
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expectation from various stakeholders to be seen to be engaged in CP (Porter and Kramer, 
2002; Wang and Qian, 2011).  
Hence more research on CP is timely, relevant and fills a knowledge gap as the next section 
outlines as it contextualises the existing research platform on which we seek to build and 
identifies the two research questions this study addresses. 
 
2. Background and research questions 
The recent systematic literature reviews of CP published in the Journal of Business Ethics in 
2015 by Liket and Simaens, and Gautier and Pache provide both a panoramic and deep view 
of key studies that have built the discipline.  The former delineates six intertwined research 
themes and three perspectives from which CP activity is analysed: the themes being concept, 
motives, determinants, practices, business outcomes, and social outcomes and the unit of 
analysis being institutional, organizational or individual (or some combination).  The latter 
writers distil four lines of research enquiry that overlap Liket and Simaens’ categories: the 
essence of CP, its drivers, organization and outcomes. 
 
Our study resonates with several of these themes and bodies of prior work, including what 
motivates or drives CP and its determinants (e.g. firm or sector characteristics).  However, we 
especially build upon the research corpus on business outcomes, particularly the impact of 
corporate giving on shareholder value.  We do so by investigating three core concepts: 
corporate philanthropy, reputation risk and shareholder value.  To bracket the three concepts 
we draw on the enlightened stakeholder theory developed by Jensen (2001).  
 
2.1 Enlightened stakeholder theory  
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Milton Friedman (1970, p. 55) wrote that ‘there is one and only one social responsibility of 
business – to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase profits so long as 
it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition 
without deception and fraud’. Thus, Friedman equates CP with the theft of someone else's 
money and a breach of fiduciary duty. However, as Shaw and Post (1996) comment, 
Friedman endorses corporate philanthropic efforts that have a strategic underpinning. This 
emphasis on a strategic outcome aligns with Jensen’s (2001) enlightened stakeholder theory.  
Gautier and Pache’s (2015) review of 30 years of intellectual research on corporate 
philanthropy using 162 academic papers suggests consensus in the literature these days that 
CP serves the company’s interests, albeit sometimes indirectly. Enlightened stakeholder 
theory recognizes that corporations favour profit-making activities over philanthropic 
contributions but that companies will suffer longer term if they do not consider the gamut of 
stakeholder interests. It asserts that a firm realising maximum value for shareholders at the 
expense of other stakeholders is unlikely to sustain. For example, paying minimum salaries to 
employees and requiring them to work in very poor conditions is likely to have a negative 
effect on productivity, which may more than offset any cost-savings and actually reduces the 
value of the firm.  In this study, we use enlightened stakeholder theory to develop a 
theoretical model of the business case for the relation between CP, corporate reputation 
management and shareholder value.  Chesters and Lawrence (2008) suggest neoclassical 
models of the firm are inadequate when explaining CP and emerging models cast 
philanthropy as influenced by simple economics, firm strategy, organisational culture and 
values.  
A firm’s ability to generate sustainable wealth over time, and hence its long term value, is 
determined by its relationships with its broad spectrum of critical stakeholders. However, 
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consistent with agency theory, boards and CEOs must evaluate all decisions on the basis of 
their impact on the market value of the company.  That is, management should still apply net 
present value analysis to decisions. Investment or financing should not be undertaken by the 
firm unless the present value of the associated incremental benefits exceeds the present value 
of the incremental costs. We suggest that it is within this framework it is more likely that CP 
will have a positive impact on firm value due to the management of firm reputation.  
2.2 Corporate Philanthropy 
Financial Accounting Standards Board defines CP as ‘an unconditional transfer of cash or 
other assets to an entity or a settle or cancellation of its liabilities in a voluntary nonreciprocal 
transfer by another entity acting other than as an owner’ (FASB 1993, p.2).  While it may 
seem  contradictory for profit-making companies to give away profits (Manne 1973), 
companies engage in CP for various reasons from a commitment to the common good to a 
tool that ultimately benefits the company long-term.  
Consequently, it is important to have a more strategic approach to philanthropy to ensure the 
benefits outweigh the costs.  Foster et al. (2008, p. 759) assert that ‘companies that have 
integrated philanthropy into their operations are quite distinct in both attitudes and behaviour 
from the others’. The strategic approach to philanthropy is important.  As Saiia (2003) states, 
by being strategic in charitable activity selection, a firm can improve its ‘bottom line’. 
However, the correlation between CP and financial performance is mixed. Friedman (1970) 
argued that philanthropy will have a negative impact on financial performance as it is simply 
a corporate expenditure that reduces profits
1
.  Berman et al. (1999) find that corporate 
involvement in community had little influence on financial performance; while Orlitzky et al. 
(2003) find a positive correlation between corporate philanthropy and financial performance.  
                                                          
1 This explains why we found many Australian firms  reluctant to report a definitive figure of corporate giving. 
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Using similar quantitative approaches several studies find a positive relationship between the 
amount of corporate giving and financial performance (Patten 2007, Su and He 2010, Wang 
and Qian 2011).  However, research is apprehensive to conclude that CP directly increases 
shareholder value.  For example, Patten (2007) finds a statistically significant positive 
relationship between large donations and the stock value of firms in the days following the 
press releases disclosing the donations.  Patten (2007) also cautions that financial 
performance will not increase if CP is not perceived as genuine by stockholders even for 
large donations.  Conversely, some studies have found either no significant relationship 
(Campbell 2002, Seifer et al 2003, 2004) or a non-linear relationship (Wang et al 2008) 
between the level of contributions and financial performance.  
While Brammer and Millington (2005) find a positive association between the size of 
unconditional donations and firm reputation, most Australian companies do not 
systematically communicate their unconditional giving (Hempel 2003).  
2.3 Reputation risk 
A key feature of the research discussed above is to compare CP as an investment instead of a 
gift or cost (Gautieer and Pache, 2015). Researchers (Shaw and Post 1993; Stendardi 1992) 
suggest the expected corporate returns are not financial but tend to be intangible such as 
reputation, prestige, or employee pride. Since the reputation of an organisation ‘is based on 
the sum of how all constituencies view the organisation’ (Argenti, 2005, p. 3), then reputation 
risk is the risk of a change in the way an organisation is perceived by its stakeholders.  
Christensen and Raynor (2003) indicate that the factors that create a reputation within the 
private sector are: long term financial performance; corporate governance and leadership; 
corporate social responsibility; workplace talent and culture; delivery of external partners’ 
promises; regulatory compliance and communication and crisis management. Murray (2003) 
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adds that managing reputation is more about the risk associated with the relationship the 
organisation has with stakeholders and the public. It is their perception of the organisation 
that contributes to the reputation of that organisation.  Essentially ‘reputation management is 
an evolving set of practices that leading companies are developing to help them cope with the 
changing expectations of their audiences, to manage the interpretations those audiences 
make, and to build favourable regard’ (Fombrun quoted in Schulz et al., 2000, p. 95).  
A passive or reactive approach to managing corporate reputation is unsustainable in today’s 
environment. This is due to many factors such as: increased public awareness about corporate 
activities, increased demand for transparency, higher expectations by multiple stakeholder 
groups, social media, effect of the influence of opinion leaders, the growth in interest groups 
and increased attention from media (Shamma, 2012). Companies need to actively manage 
their reputations and not merely react to situations of heightened reputation risk.  
Corporations can use donations as a way to manage their reputation as evidenced by research 
finding firms with higher levels of philanthropic expenditures have better reputations 
(Brammer and Millington, 2005).  Ditley-Simonson and Midttun (2010) posit that in the 
current context of higher scrutiny there is a longer term approach to profit or value-
maximising business strategies that involves philanthropy. 
Enlightened stakeholder theory suggests activities that bring reputational benefits to the 
company will increase both profitability and market valuation in the longer term. Examples 
of this include decisions to improve product quality or donate to medical research, both of 
which might have an initial detrimental impact on profitability but contribute to the 
improvement in the company’s market image which in turn increases in long-term 
profitability and market value. 
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Atkins et al. (2006, p. 8) provide the following example to demonstrate the long-term benefits 
of reputation management. ‘If a company has a reputation for putting profit before principle, 
it will face a tougher battle to protect its reputation.  Companies that weather a crisis of 
reputation have often accumulated ‘credit in the bank’ with the public and stakeholders’.  In 
other words, a company with a good, solid reputation will often withstand a threat to its 
reputation during a crisis, as it has a greater agility and reservoir of goodwill to withstand the 
impact of the crisis. This is also commonly referred to as moral capital and these elements of 
the literature suggest that building a stock of ‘moral capital’ can be critical in guarding a 
company’s reputation.   
This study extends this theory by determining whether investing in philanthropy builds a 
bank of moral capital. Researchers such as Gardberg and Fombrun (2006) and Godfrey et al. 
(2009) find that a good reputation can act as robust protection when negative events occur.  
Dowling (2006) proposes that the reputation of a company is the ultimate responsibility of the 
board, unlike many reputation experts who believe it lies with the CEO and other executives. 
Trust, which is an integral component of reputation and company performance, can be 
improved in the minds of stakeholders, as the company’s reputation increases.  This leads to 
the question: how can a company portray its CP to stakeholders to gain a good reputation and 
at the same time increase shareholder value?  
 
2.4 Corporate philanthropy, reputation risk management and shareholder value 
Although researchers agree that corporate philanthropy does influence the publics’ 
perceptions of a firm (Smith, 1994; Himmelstein, 1997; Saiia et al, 2003), whether this 
correlation is positive or negative is mixed.  Some research (Knauer, 1994 and Godfrey, 
2005) asserts that public goodwill is gained by participation in charitable activities. As 
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highlighted earlier, Brammer and Millington (2005) find that firms with higher levels of 
philanthropic expenditures have better reputations. However, many also disagree with this 
proposal.  Many of the negative associations centre on public perceptions that it is self-
interest of the companies’ that motivates charitable activities. Bae and Cameron (2006) 
contend that when a company has obtained a good reputation, its philanthropic activities will 
be viewed with less scepticism thereby mitigating the self-interest perspective. However, they 
find that public scepticism in corporate giving diminishes corporate reputation.  
Godfrey (2005, p. 777) makes three theoretical assertions: ‘(1) corporate philanthropy can 
generate positive moral capital among communities and stakeholders, (2) moral capital can 
provide shareholders with insurance-like protection for a firm’s relationship-based intangible 
assets, and (3) this protection contributes to shareholder wealth’. Research supporting these 
assertions finds that a positive relationship between philanthropy and performance is stronger 
for firms with greater public visibility (reputation) and for those with better past performance, 
as philanthropy by these firms gains more positive stakeholder responses (Wang and Qian, 
2011).  
Accordingly, the two main research questions addressed in this paper are: 
1) Does CP mitigate or increase firms’ reputational risk?  
2) Does shareholder valuation of CP depend on the firm’s management of its reputation 
risk?  
 
3. Research Method 
To test the first research question requires a collection of reputational data relevant to each 
company. Based on prior research (Deephouse, 2000; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990), media 
analysis is conducted to ascertain a media reputation score. Media Agenda Setting Theory 
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‘posits a relationship between the relative emphasis given by the media to various topics and 
the degree of salience these topics have for the general public’ (Ader, 1995, p. 300).   In other 
words, media coverage influences public perception as it places the organisation at the 
forefront of the public’s minds.   
McCombs and Shaw (1972) investigate the agenda-setting hypothesis with fairly robust 
results.  Their study supports the theory that the media can set the tone for the public opinion 
of an organisation’s reputation. Carroll (2004) tests agenda setting in business news content. 
The study supports the notion that agenda setting predicts that more media coverage about a 
firm would result in a higher degree of public awareness of that firm. Data is collected from a 
variety of media sources of each participating company.  The information collected is coded 
using the content analysis computer software, NVivo.  A select sample was initially coded by 
hand to test the results against those obtained through the computer software.  Following this 
test, the remaining data is analysed using the program.  The results from this analysis are used 
to ascertain a reputation score for each company, based on agreed metrics among the three 
researchers that indicate measures of presence and strength of good and poor reputation.   
 
Testing the second research question requires careful consideration of potential endogeneity 
between variables of corporate reputation, corporate giving and shareholder value because all 
three variables are likely to be associated. We would expect that CP will be associated with 
reputational risk and likewise reputational risk is associated with CP. In addition we expect 
that shareholder value to be associated with CP and reputational risk.   Random effects 
regression is likely to produce either non-significant coefficients or coefficients that are 
statistically significant but of substantially lower magnitude compared to three-stage least 
squares (3SLS) regression. This is because the random effects regressions will possibly 
produce biased standard errors and suffer from Type I error. In contrast the 3SLS method, 
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which takes into account covariances between the error terms of different equations, is more 
likely to provide unbiased and consistent standard errors, thus yielding more robust 
coefficient results and valid tests of hypotheses (Setia-Atmaja, Tanewski and Skully, 2009)
2
.  
The main difference between two-stage least squares (2SLS) and 3SLS estimations is that 
3SLS captures cross-equation effects as error terms of individual equations in the system 
which are assumed to be contemporaneously correlated under 3SLS. Also, the 3SLS 
estimation technique is more suitable for cross-sectional studies, where some of the changes 
in firm value differ due to different investment in the community which is different for 
various levels of reputational risk. As a result, reputation risk management, corporate giving 
and firm value issues can affect each other in various ways. These interactions can be 
captured through the 3SLS estimation technique. 
To eliminate the potential endogeneity problem or reverse causality, the estimation 
endogenizes reputation risk management, corporate giving and shareholder value (Tobin’s 
Q). The three equations are solved as a system of simultaneous equations using three-stage 
least squares (3SLS) estimation method.  The three equations set out below are used to test 
the two research questions simultaneously. 
 
RQ1 
CorpGiving = a + B1Reputational risk +B2firm size + B3firm age + B4firm performance + 
B5FCF + B7industry + e          (1) 
Reputational risk = a + B1corpgiving + B2firm size + B3social + B4environmental + e (2) 
 
                                                          
2 The Durbin–Wu–Hausman (DWH) test which determines whether there is no endogeneity in the equation (null 
hypotheses). The significant DWH tests (F (1, 681); p = 0.0000) indicate that endogeneity is present in the OLS 
estimates and the instruments have corrected for it.  
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The next step in the analysis tests the mediating role of reputational risk on the association 
between philanthropic expenditures and shareholder value. 
RQ2 
Shareholder valuet+1 = a + B1reputational risk + B2philanthropic expenditures + 
B3reputational risk*philanthropic expenditures + B4controls + e     (3) 
 
3.1 Dependent variables 
3.1.1 Reputation risk 
Following the common practice of media research (Janis and Fadner, 1965; Weber, 1990; 
Deephouse, 2000; Sinnewe and Niblock, 2015), newspaper data will be coded as positive
3
 
(Fombrun, 1996; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990), negative
4
 (Deephouse, 2000) and neutral. 
One of the most frequently used and sophisticated software that assists with the media coding 
is Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) Financial Sentiment Dictionaries. The Financial 
Sentiment Dictionaries can aid in obtaining the ratio of positive and negative to total unit 
count. We then combine these two ratios into one reputation risk management score by 
adopting the formula that has been largely used in reputation research, the “coefficient of 
imbalance” (Brown and Deegan, 1998; Dickson, 1992; Deephouse, 2000; Tong, 2013; 
Sinnewe and Niblock, 2015).  
 
                                                          
3 Examples such as companies are praised for their action, or an award, monetary or other kind of donation etc.  
4 Examples such as companies are criticized for action etc.  
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Where P is the number of positive units, N the number of negative units, and T the total 
number of positive and negative units. 
 
This variable utilises the reputational data collected to calculate a score out of 100 for each 
company. The higher the score, the better reputation the company has meaning the more 
effective their reputation risk management. 
3.1.2 Philanthropic expenditure 
Unlike the 1985 UK Companies Act where companies are obliged to disclose charitable 
donations that exceed 200 pounds, there is no such disclosure requirement for Australian 
firms.  Any disclosure of charitable donations or community investment is entirely voluntary. 
Typically, firms that disclose that they are involved in community investment either provide a 
narrative and amounts donated/in-kind or a narrative only. The only way to access Australian 
data is by survey or by paying a UK organisation to collect the data.  
Unlike previous research which has used the absolute figure for charitable donations (e.g. 
Brammer and Millington), our measure of philanthropic expenditure is a measure of 
charitable donations as a percentage of profit before tax for the top 300 firms
5
.  This is 
supplemented in the data with disclosure of community investment within Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) reports. That is, we add this amount to charitable donations if disclosed 
giving us a total of 330 firms. In addition checking against the GRI reports ensured the 
amounts provided were accurate. 
3.1.3 Shareholder value 
The last component of the study is an investigation of shareholder value and shareholder 
wealth using two market measures. First, TSR = total shareholder return or return on 
                                                          
5 We purchased this data from a UK firm that collects this information. 
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common stock consists of the [year-end closing price of a firm’s stock + dividends per share] 
/ the share price of the previous year.  This measure reflects the one-year total gain (loss) a 
shareholder receives for holding the firm’s common stock (Bloom and Milkovich, 1998; 
Kren and Kerr, 1997). Second, Tobin’s Q = the market value of the firm / replacement value 
of assets which a simple measure of Tobin’s Q as adopted by Agrawal and Knoeber (1996).  
The market value of the firm is the market value of equity (total number of issued shares by 
the ordinary share price at year-end) and debt (total of short and long-term debt).  The 
replacement value of the firm’s assets is the book value of total assets.  This simple measure 
of Tobin’s Q is adopted because it is highly correlated with the traditionally inflation-
adjusted figures and ease of computation.  Shareholder value is measured at t+1 as corporate 
giving is more likely to affect future value rather than current value and we include t-1 to 
control for reverse causality. Including lagged performance (TOBINSQt-1) as an independent 
variable allows for performance persistence and for feedback from past performance to 
current corporate giving (Bohren and Strom, 2010; Wooldridge, 2002). Inclusion of the lag of 
the dependent variable is likely to mitigate concerns over reverse causality and omitted 
variables. To the extent that omitted correlated variables are relatively stable, their effects can 
be captured by lagged values of the dependent variable. 
3.3 Control variables  
The two papers that consider research question closest to ours are Godfrey et al. (2009) and 
Brammer and Millington (2005).  We draw on these papers to determine the appropriate 
control variables to reduce the possibility of biased results from omitted variables.  Godfrey 
at al. (2009) identify the following firm characteristics that are likely to be associated with 
corporate giving: firm size, industry, return on assets (ROA), and leverage. We also control 
for the following variables that are likely to impact corporate giving (model 1): free cash 
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flows measured as gross cash flow less gross investment. Free cash flow is not affected by 
capital structure as the tax benefits of debt are reversed out, company age and industry, older 
companies and certain industries are likely to give to charity. 
In the reputation risk model (2) we control for firms that have social externalities (e.g. 
gambling, alcohol, tobacco, pharmaceuticals, and defence) or environmental impacts (e.g. 
chemical, mining and utilities) as they are likely to have an impact on reputation (Brammer 
and Millington, 2005). Firm size and profit before tax (PBT) are also likely to be associated 
with reputational risk. The controls in the shareholder value model (3) are chosen by their 
impact on shareholder value and having no association with reputation risk or corporate 
giving. It is unlikely that the year, the previous year’s shareholder value or the current years 
leverage is going to have any direct association on the current year’s reputation risk or 
corporate giving.  Firm size is included in all the models as it is an important variable of 
nearly all factors.  
3.4 Sample 
The sample consists of the top 100 Australian publicly listed firms for 2011, 2012 and 2013 
that engaged in philanthropic activities with an additional 30 collected from the Global 
Reporting Initiative disclosures.  These years were chosen as the most recent and the least 
likely to have a major disaster, such as the floods in 2010, fires in 2008 and Tsunami in 2004. 
Disclosure of the dollar value of philanthropic activities is required to measure the 
significance of the activity as a percentage of total revenue.  We started with a sample size of 
330, which was reduced to 299 after eliminating firms with missing variables. 
4. Results 
Table 1 reports the industry frequencies for the sample of 330 Australian firms before the 
reduction to test the research questions.  The most frequent industry in our sample is oil and 
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gas (14.8 percent) followed by mining (9.7 percent). Table 2 Panel A summarizes the 
descriptive statistics for the continuous variables of the pooled balanced panel of 330 
observations for 2011 to 2013 firms and Panel B provides the descriptive for the categorical 
variables. The average score for reputational risk management is 65 percent out of a possible 
100 percent. The average corporate giving as a percentage of profit before tax is 0.31 percent. 
The average TOBINSQt is 0.91 and the average TSRt of 5.98.  Nearly one-third the sample 
(32 percent) is in an industry that has some impact on the environment while only 8.2 percent 
are in an industry that has a social impact. Fifty-one percent of the sample provides GRI 
compliant reports. 
Table 3 shows the Pearson 2-tailed correlation matrix.  This table demonstrates a significant 
positive correlation between reputation risk management and corporate giving.  In Table 4 we 
tested the relationship between philanthropy, reputation and shareholder value using an OLS 
regression model using panel data and clustering by firm. The results of these tests show a 
strong association between corporate giving and reputation and visa versa, demonstrating the 
need to control for reverse causality. The interaction between corporate giving and reputation 
on shareholder value are not significant hence we turn our attention to controlling for 
potential endogeneity by using 3SLS estimation. 
Table 5 reports the results from testing the research questions simultaneously. Panel A 
presents the results for the 3SLS estimation of the three equations in which shareholder value 
is measured as Tobin’s Q  while shareholder returns (TSR) is reported in Panel B. Column 1 
of Table 4 Panel A shows the effect of reputation risk on corporate giving as specified by Eq. 
(1). Column 2 shows the effect of corporate giving on reputation (Eq. 2). Column 3 shows the 
effect of reputation risk and corporate giving on Tobin’s Q (Eq. 3).  
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Panel A (column 1) of Table 4 shows that reputation risk management is a significant 
determinant of corporate giving which supports H1. Corporate giving is positively associated 
with reputation risk management (B = 0.207; p < 0.001). Column 2 shows reputation risk is 
positively associated with corporate giving (B= 4.67; p < 0.001). Column 3 shows that 
corporate giving is negatively associated with Tobin’s Q (B = -1.137 < 0.05) and reputational 
risk is positively associated with Tobin’s Q (B= 0.060; p < 0.001). The economic significance 
of this result is that for every cent in the dollar the firm spends on corporate giving, Tobin’s 
Q will decrease by 0.413%. In contrast, if the firm increase their reputation by 1 point then 
Tobin’s Q will increase by 0.267%.  Consequently, the interaction of corporate giving and 
reputation risk management is positively associated with shareholder value (B = 0.008; p < 
0.05). This result means that the firm should manage it reputation while concurrently 
increasing its corporate giving if it wants to increase shareholders’ value of the firm. In other 
words, the market places greater value on corporate giving when the firm also manages its 
reputation.  
Panel B reports no significant associations between corporate giving or reputation risk 
management and shareholder wealth. There are several plausible reasons for the differences 
in the results for shareholder value and shareholder wealth. Shareholder value (Tobin’s Q) is 
measured using firm value which incorporates forward looking information and market 
perception.  Tobin’s Q is measured as the market value of the firm divided by replacement 
value of assets.
  If Tobin’s Q is greater than one, the market value of shareholder and creditor 
investment is greater than the amortized historical cost of the assets.  Because Tobin’s Q 
measures the market value of shareholder and creditor investment it encompasses a market 
assessment of the investment opportunity set and future cash flows of the firm. Shareholder 
return (TSR) is a measure of the return to stock holders which is based on past performance. 
This measure reflects the one-year total gain (loss) a shareholder receives for holding the 
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firm’s common stock.  The decision to pay dividends will be adversely affected by corporate 
giving as there will be less cash to pay dividends by definition. 
The results of the study suggest that, while directly controlling for endogeneity with 3SLS, 
that increasing firms’ investment in corporate giving increases the likelihood that there will 
be an increase in shareholder value given the association between reputation risk 
management and corporate giving.  That is, the market foresees that the impact of corporate 
giving on reputational risk management occurs in the future and hence is included in an 
increase in shareholder value. 
5. Conclusion 
The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of CP on corporate reputation and 
shareholder value. Particular attention is paid to the role that corporate giving and reputation 
risk management play in determining shareholder value.  The study finds that it is the 
interplay of corporate giving and reputation risk management that is positively associated 
with shareholder value. Taken separately, corporate giving is negatively associated with 
shareholder value while reputation risk management is positively related to shareholder 
value.  This result means if firms want to be viewed favourably for their involvement in 
corporate giving they must also concurrently manage their reputation. Our results concur with 
those of Patten (2007) finds a statistically significant positive relationship between large 
donations and the stock value of firms. Patten (2007) suggests financial performance will not 
increase if CP is not perceived as genuine by stockholders, even for very large contributions. 
The limitation inherent in this study is that our sample is limited to the top 100 firms and 
those that disclose the actual amount of funds corporations donate.  There seems to be 
reluctance by many corporations to disclose how much they give.  Future research could 
investigate the reasons for lack of disclosure. A fruitful area of further research would be to 
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examine the opinions of directors regarding the extent of corporations’ philanthropic 
activities and their opinions on the disclosure of such activities.  
The findings of this study aid in building a stronger theoretical and practical foundation for 
CP. The main contribution is that overall, that firms that engage in CP (for whatever 
motivation) must also improve their reputation to increase their shareholder value.  
Consequently, our results are aligned with enlightened stakeholder theory because we find 
that CP may have an initial detrimental impact on profitability but contributes to the 
improvement in the company’s market image which then translates to increases in market 
valuation in the longer term. Our results support the notion that CP has not only the benefits 
to society, but also distinct financial benefits to an organisation. 
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